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Big Data promises important societal progress but exac-
erbates the need for due process and accountability. Com-
panies and institutions can now discriminate between users
at an individual level using collected data or past behav-
ior. Worse, today they can do so in near perfect opacity.
The nascent field of web transparency aims to develop the
tools and methods necessary to reveal how information is
used, however today it lacks robust tools that let users and
investigators identify targeting using multiple inputs.
Here, we formalize for the first time the problem of detect-
ing and identifying targeting on combinations of inputs and
provide the first algorithm that is asymptotically exact. This
algorithm is designed to serve as a theoretical foundational
block to build future scalable and robust web transparency
tools. It offers three key properties. First, our algorithm is
service agnostic and applies to a variety of settings under
a broad set of assumptions. Second, our algorithm’s analy-
sis delineates a theoretical detection limit that characterizes
which forms of targeting can be distinguished from noise
and which cannot. Third, our algorithm establishes fun-
damental tradeoffs that lead the way to new metrics for the
science of web transparency. Understanding the tradeoff be-
tween effective targeting and targeting concealment lets us
determine under which conditions predatory targeting can
be made unprofitable by transparency tools.
1. QUICK OVERVIEW
A primer on web transparency tools.
To address the big-data web’s untenable opacity, a new
set of transparency tools have been proposed recently [7, 4,
5, 6, 3, 9]. Generally speaking, they assume no insider infor-
mation about how the data-driven web service operates and
instead rely on a specific form of black box testing [2] to de-
tect data use. Briefly, a transparency tool works as follows.
First, it collects the results of a series of tests in which inputs
vary, e.g., browsing history [7], search history [4], emails [6],
locations [9], or explicit profile information [3]. Second, by
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examining the observed outputs – e.g., search results [4, 9],
ads seen [3, 6], recommendations [6, 5], or prices [7, 5] – the
tool deduces how the system personalizes its behavior based
on this input. Finally, the tool’s deductions are used as hy-
potheses that are further analyzed for implications by the
tool’s users, such as end users, journalists, privacy watch-
dogs, or federal investigators.
To be valuable to their users, transparency tools strive to
meet three requirements:
1. Scalability: Each test may involve multiple prelimi-
nary steps to open a new web account and populating
its inputs. These steps cannot always be automated
and may be expensive (e.g., creating a Google account
requires buying a new phone number). It is also im-
portant to keep resources to a minimum as the size of
outputs/inputs grows.
2. Accuracy: The deduction that the tool provides should
be sound, which means that it can be trusted not to
originate from noise or other limitations of the exper-
iments. The tool should also be complete which spec-
ifies that it rarely misses an important deduction.
3. Broad Applicability: Ideally, the same tool should
apply not only to many different services but also var-
ious forms of data usage within those services, with
only minor and intellectually simple changes.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first two requirements are of-
ten in conflict. The third makes the problem extremely chal-
lenging, and has barely been considered to date. With few
exceptions [6, 3], previous transparency tools were designed
for a specific service or usage in order to detect a particularly
sensitive topic: price discrimination [7], search results per-
sonalization [4], censorship [9]. Only recently has develop-
ment of widely-applicable, generic tools begun to be consid-
ered to allow generic data collections [5] and service-agnostic
detection methods [6, 3]. Despite appearences, however, we
find that even the latest transparency tools are limited in the
kind of data uses they can support accurately and scalably.
We believe that the biggest roadblock is the lack of sup-
port for detecting complex, multi-input targeting, which we
find mandatory for building scalable, accurate, and broadly
applicable tools.
Our new findings.
We prove that targeting that uses one or several com-
binations of N inputs can be detected and identified with
asymptotically perfect accuracy, and that this only requires
a logarithmic order O(ln(N)) of experimental observations.
To place our contribution in respect to prior work, this shows
that a web transparency tool can remain scalable and accu-
rate, without being strictly restricted to single input target-
ing. However, and this is where our contribution contrasts
the most with previous results, it comes at a cost: the in-
tensity of targeting (defined below) needs to be sufficiently
large. In other words, web transparency need not always be
blind to combined targeting, however as the inherent com-
plexity of targeting increases, targeting becomes easier to
conceal. Our results open a new chapter in the understand-
ing of Big Data: to determine sufficient and necessary con-
ditions under which one can prevent its opacity.
2. PROBLEMFORMULATION&RESULTS
We formalize the following intuitive problem: given a set
of N inputs representing possible information items present
in a user’s account (such as emails or searches), we wish to
determine how they affect occurence of one particular output
of interest (such as an ad or a recommendation).
Our main assumption is that the output is affected through
an unknown targeting function f of the inputs, to be deter-
mined. The function f is defined separately for each output.
The targeting function f is a mapping from the set of all
combinations to {0; 1}. By convention, f(C) = 1 indicates
that an account containing C is targeted, and we denote
f(.) = 0 if the ad is untargeted.
Experiments and outcome properties.
Because in practice we have no access to the targeting
function, we rely on experiments to observe its reaction to
various inputs. Intuitively, these experiments collect out-
puts from a set of accounts that contain subsets of the inputs
and produce a set of observations of f . For example, experi-
ments could collect ads for accounts with different subsets of
emails. More formally, the experimental infrastructure we
assume is similar to an oracle from function learning the-
ory [8, 1]. We assume that our experimental oracle satisfies
the following axiom. There exist two probabilities pin, pout
such that:
P [O(Ci)=1|f(Ci)=1 ]≥pin > pout≥P [O(Cj)=1|f(Cj)=0 ] .
where pin is a minimal bound on the probability that an
account receives an output that is relevant for it and pout is
a maximal bound on the probability that an account receives
an output that is not relevant for it. This axiom properly
states that f is related to the outcome we study. It allows
the variables to also depend on other factors: hidden inputs
that are not in the set of N we study, external sources of
randomness such as availability of ad-slot, competition. One
experimental design used in practice [6, 3] and that fits this
axiom is to populate each account randomly so that an input
independently appears with probability α.
Under the assumptions above, we say that an algorithm
using m observations solves the targeting detection problem
if it can correctly decide whether f(.) 6= 0 and hence that
the output is targeted using at most m queries to O. Go-
ing further, an algorithm solves the targeting identification
problem if it correctly returns the function f . Naturally,
both problems rely on random observations and hence our
goal is to design algorithms whose detection/identification
error is arbitrarily small for large N .
Since one should distinguish (at least) between N inputs,
it seems that a minimum of Ω(ln(N)) binary observations
are absolutely necessary at least for the identification. This
is hence what we assume and we aim at keeping it at this
absolute minimum.
Theorem 1. Assuming that f is a monotone DNF with
size at most s and width at most w, and that ratio pout/pin
is below a predetermined bound, we provide a targeting de-
tection algorithm that for any ε > 0 requires O(ln(N/ε))
observations, O(Ns ln(N/ε)) operations and is correct with
probability (1− ε/N).
Theorem 2. Under the same assumption, we provide a
targeting identification algorithm that for any ε > 0 requires
O(ln(N/ε)) observations, O(Ns+w ln(N/ε)) operations and
is correct with probability (1− ε/N).
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